Species pluralism does not imply species eliminativism
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Brigandt, I. (2003). Species pluralism does not imply species eliminativism. Philosophy of Science, 70(5), 1305-1316. http://doi.org/10.1086/377409
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http://doi.org/10.1086/377409
Abstract
Description
Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. Based on the idea that the species concept is a so‐called investigative kind concept, it is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
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© 2003 Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
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en