Species pluralism does not imply species eliminativism

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dc.contributor.authorBrigandt, Ingo
dc.date.accessioned2025-05-01T12:26:03Z
dc.date.available2025-05-01T12:26:03Z
dc.date.issued2003
dc.descriptionMarc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. Based on the idea that the species concept is a so‐called investigative kind concept, it is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.7939/R3VT1H45P
dc.language.isoen
dc.relationhttp://doi.org/10.1086/377409
dc.relation.isversionofBrigandt, I. (2003). Species pluralism does not imply species eliminativism. Philosophy of Science, 70(5), 1305-1316. http://doi.org/10.1086/377409
dc.rights© 2003 Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectPopulation Ecology
dc.subjectConservation Biology
dc.subjectPluralist School
dc.subjectSpecies
dc.subjectBiological Taxonomies
dc.subjectTaxa
dc.subjectBiology
dc.subjectEcological Genetics
dc.subjectEcological Selection
dc.subjectBiological Evolution
dc.titleSpecies pluralism does not imply species eliminativism
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
ual.jupiterAccesshttp://terms.library.ualberta.ca/public

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