Should Central Banks issue Digital Currencies and Impose Position Limits to Increase Market Efficiency?

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SSHRC Awarded IG 2018: In this proposed research, I provide new economic insights on the trade-offs between efficiency gains and potential social costs in two concrete cases of technological development and new regulation: central bank digital currency (CBDC) and position limits. While these are separate and independent features, both address questions regarding market efficiency and social benefits, and the development of novel dynamic models to study equilibrium quantities and their fluctuations over time.

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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_1843

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© Frei, Christoph. All rights reserved other than by permission. This document embargoed to those without UAlberta CCID until 2026

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