Natural kinds and concepts: A pragmatist and methodologically naturalistic account
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Brigandt, I. (2011). Natural kinds and concepts: A pragmatist and methodologically naturalistic account. In J. Knowles & H. Rydenfelt (Eds.), Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism (pp. 171-196). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Publishing.
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In this chapter I lay out a notion of philosophical naturalism that aligns with pragmatism. It is developed and illustrated by a presentation of my views on natural kinds and my theory of concepts. Both accounts reflect a methodological naturalism and are defended no by way of metaphysical considerations, but in terms of their philosophical fruitfulness. A core theme is that the epistemic interests of scientists have to be taken into account by any naturalistic philosophy of science in general, and any account of natural kinds and scientific concepts in particular. I conclude with general methodological remarks on how to develop and defend philosophical notions without using intuitions.
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248
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en