A crossdisciplinary exploration of essentialism about kinds: philosophical perspectives in feminism and the philosophy of biology
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Abstract
“Essentialism about kinds” is the belief that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for membership in a kind. This thesis addresses the parallels in the discussions of essentialism across feminism and the philosophy of biology. Specifically, I address the similarities and differences between how feminists and philosophers of biology have thought about the errors of essentialism and why it should be rejected. As well, I discuss the alternative “solutions” that each discipline has proposed in its place. By way of conclusion, I side with the “epistemological approach” as the most successful solution to the essentialism of kinds in the context of feminism and philosophy of biology. I provide reasons for the superiority of this solution, and in particular, its wide applicability across disciplines. I also demonstrate how the crossdisciplinary dialogue in this thesis is a case in point of the interdisciplinary strength of the epistemological approach.