A Phenomenological Interpretation of Organisms

Abstract

In contemporary scientific theories of evolution, organisms are construed as if they were the products of genes and gene-expression. Much of our biological research operate on the assumptions that (1) organisms are reducible to and reconstructible from their genes, and (2) the organism, as a whole, is constituted by genes in a mosaic manner. The aim of my thesis is to reconsider organisms from a phenomenological point of view. I take up the question of how organisms exist by revisiting the phenomenon of organismsâthat is, the manner in which organisms appear and show themselvesâif we bracket our pre-established ways of knowing them. By suspending the usual theories and dichotomies by which we think of organisms, I show the potential of a phenomenological approach for an examination of organisms that does beyond what is available to biology as a science, or to standard philosophy of biology. Specifically drawing on the works of Merleau-Ponty, I will argue that organisms are âlived-bodiesâ, and that the relation they bear with their environment is one of meaning. I begin by recounting our current scientific (mechanistic) account of organisms from the Modern Synthesis theory of evolution, and the position of gene-centrism within the Modern Synthesis. I then consider alternatives within scientific biology to gene-centrism, specifically, objections arising from Ecological Evolutionary Development and Niche Construction Theory in favours of a more ecological approach to evolution. Next I turn to the Umwelt Theory of Jakob von Uexküll, both as a secondary objection against mechanistic biology, and as an argument for the relevance of meaning in biology. Criticizing each view presented in these chapters, I argue that they are each inadequate (albeit not strictly mistaken) in their various accounts of organisms. It is lastly with the help of Merleau-Ponty that I argue we can explore a more adequate understanding of organisms and the organism-environment relation.