Group-Level Cognition

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dc.contributor.authorWilson, Robert A.
dc.date.accessioned2025-05-01T12:26:07Z
dc.date.available2025-05-01T12:26:07Z
dc.date.issued2001
dc.descriptionDavid Sloan Wilson has recently revived the idea of a group mind as an application of group selectionist thinking to cognition. Central to my discussion of this idea is the distinction between the claim that groups have a psychology and what I call the social manifestation thesis-a thesis about the psychology of individuals. Contemporary work on this topic has confused these two theses. My discussion also points to research questions and issues that Wilson's work raises, as well as their connection to externalist conceptions of the mind familiar since the work of Putnam and Burge.
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.7939/R3154F37H
dc.language.isoen
dc.relationhttp://doi.org/10.1086/392914
dc.relation.isversionofWilson, R.A. (2001). Group-Level Cognition. Philosophy of Science, 68(S3), S262-S273. http://doi.org/10.1086/392914
dc.rights© 2001 Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
dc.subjectMind
dc.subjectPsychology
dc.subjectCognitive Psychology
dc.subjectSocial Psychology
dc.subjectEvolutionary Psychology
dc.subjectPsychological Symptoms
dc.subjectGroup Mind
dc.subjectBiological Adaptation
dc.subjectGroup Selection
dc.subjectCognition
dc.titleGroup-Level Cognition
dc.typehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
ual.jupiterAccesshttp://terms.library.ualberta.ca/public

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