Heidegger on Wonder, Restraint, and the Beginnings of Philosophy

Abstract

This thesis aims to contribute to the study of the history of 20th century continental philosophy, centering in particular on Heidegger’s “being-historical” writings of the 1930s and the 1940s, with a special emphasis on his Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event). In particular, this thesis takes up the question of the transition from the first beginning of thinking, the original Greek inception of philosophy, to the other beginning of thinking that is yet to come. To this end, this thesis focuses on the relation of “wonder” (Wunder, Er-staunen) as the basic disposition of the first beginning—as that which inaugurates philosophy and gives Western thinking its basic orientation since the ancient Greeks—and the disposition of the other beginning, which is variously termed by Heidegger as “shock” (Erschrecken), “diffidence” (Scheu), “presentiment” (Ahnung), “foreboding” (Er-ahnen), and especially “restraint” (Verhaltenheit). The central argument of the present thesis is that that the still unknown and unexperienced disposition of the other beginning cannot be understood on the basis of wonder, but must instead be understood as its dispositional “counter-thrust.” Thus, although the disposition of the other beginning indeed presupposes wonder, and stands in a definite relation to it, it disposes human beings to initiate a “leap” into a more originary grounding wherein beings can be retrieved from out of the truth of beyng and, conversely, the truth of beyng can be once again sheltered in beings.