Causal Depth, Theoretical Appropriateness, and Individualism in Psychology
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Wilson, R.A. (1994). Causal Depth, Theoretical Appropriateness, and Individualism in Psychology. Philosophy of Science, 61(1), 55-75. http://doi.org/10.1086/289780
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http://doi.org/10.1086/289780
Abstract
Description
Individualists claim that wide explanations in psychology are problematic. I argue that wide psychological explanations sometimes have greater explanatory power than individualistic explanations. The aspects of explanatory power I focus on are causal depth and theoretical appropriateness. Reflection on the depth and appropriateness of other wide explanations of behavior, such as evolutionary explanations, clarifies why wide psychological explanations sometimes have more causal depth and theoretical appropriateness than narrow psychological explanations. I also argue for the rejection of eliminative materialism.
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
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© 1994 Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
Language
en